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ABSTRACT
We consider saving decisions in an economy where agents are characterized by het-
erogeneous levels of sophistication. In our simple setting, we are able to make a dis-
tinction between aspects of fundamental sophistication and strategic sophistication. 
The equilibrium of this economy is inefficient as sophisticated households do not 
offset the distortions that result from information and behavior of naive households. 
We show instances in which increments in the ability of sophisticated households 
to perceive more precise information results in less efficient outcomes. Additionally, 
we identify simple policy interventions that would increase welfare levels.
Key Words: saving decisions, heterogeneity, sophistication.
RESUMEN
Se estudia una economía en que agentes dotados de diverso grado de sofisticación 
deciden el nivel de ahorros. En el simple marco de análisis propuesto, es posible ha-
cer una distinción entre sofisticación estructural y sofisticación estratégica. El equili-
brio de esta economía es ineficiente debido a que el accionar de los hogares con alto 
nivel de sofisticación no logra corregir las distorsiones que resultan de las creencias 
y el comportamiento asociado los hogares menos sofisticados. Se muestran ejemplos 
en los que incrementos en la capacidad de los hogares sofisticados para percibir 
información más precisa resulta en asignaciones menos eficientes. Se identifican in-
tervenciones de política simples que resultan en mayores niveles de bienestar.
Palabras Clave: decisiones de ahorro, heterogeneidad, sofisticación.
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I. Introduction
When making saving decisions, households use explicit or implicit assess-
ments of the future flow of income. These evaluations are formed while 
interacting in an economy populated by other households solving similar 
problems. If the understanding of the environment is complete then, the 
associated decisions will respond with precision to future income flows; if 
this is the case, there is little value in evaluating the process through which 
these accurate expectations are formed. Additionally, in the absence of ex-
ternalities, the allocations that result from competitive markets would be 
efficient. In contrast, once limited and asymmetric predictive abilities are 
admitted, there is value in evaluating the link between alternative profiles 
of predictive abilities and economic outcomes. 
In this spirit, the present work focuses on a simple situation in which 
agents are characterized by different capacities with respect to their ability 
to make forecasts. More specifically, we consider a two period endowment 
economy populated by households that interact in a market where they 
exchange loan contracts. Households are characterized by different levels 
of sophistication. Naïve (naive) households make decisions influenced by 
non-informative signals and respond to prices. Sophisticated households 
make decisions considering prices and informative private signals of fu-
ture income. In addition, sophisticated households infer information from 
market dynamics. Interpreting the information contained in market out-
comes requires a model of the way other agents behave and information 
regarding others agents’ beliefs. We assume sophisticated households are 
not unlimitedly so; their skills are constrained by the signals’ precision 
and the accurateness of their models of others’.
The equilibrium of this economy is in general inefficient due to the joint 
influence of imperfect information, inadequate decisions given informa-
tion sets and imperfect substitutability in consumption that limits the ca-
pacity to offset distortions. Inefficiencies persist even in instances when 
sophisticated households’ beliefs are correct. In this case, sophisticated 
households accommodate naïve demand shock through a combination of 
variation in prices and trades in financial contracts.
our analysis illustrates how changes in different aspects of sophisti-
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cated households’ learning processes are associated with variations in ac-
tions, price patterns and welfare levels. We show instances in which in-
crements in specific skills of sophisticated households can result in lower 
welfare levels. For example, increasing the precision with which sophis-
ticated households observe naïve households’ beliefs can result in lower 
welfare. Additionally, welfare can decrease as sophisticated households 
perceive more precise information regarding future income. The message 
seems to indicate that under the presence of various imperfections in the 
ability to learn about the environment and select proper actions, improve-
ment in some learning skills that are not accompanied by improvements 
in other aspects might lead to worse outcomes. This type of result can be 
explained as one instance in which the theory of the second best applies.1 
That is, in an economy with multiple imperfections reducing one of those 
imperfections does not necessarily lead to better outcomes. 
The present work focuses on a situation in which the description of the 
way in which the agents form expectations is a relatively complex object. on 
the other hand, the structure of the economy is extremely simple. In particu-
lar, this is a scenario it is not possible to modify aggregate consumption lev-
els. The interpretations of the results provided and the determination of its 
range of validity need to be made taking into account these considerations.
Our approach is related to contributions in behavioral finance that de-
velop theoretical frameworks in which agents with different levels of so-
phistication interact. De Long, Summers and Waldmann (1990a) is a prom-
inent contribution that models a financial market in which one fraction of 
the investors hold biased beliefs regarding the return of the traded assets. 
They show that short term sophisticated agents are not able to eliminate 
the distortions that result from noise trader’s price pressure. In a related 
paper, De Long et al. (1990b) analyze a scenario in which sophisticated 
arbitrageurs can anticipate noise trader’s reaction to past prices. In this 
context, sophisticated agents are responsible for excess volatility as they 
trade anticipating that the reaction of naïve traders to this trading activity 
will permit unloading the positions at a gain.
1. For the seminal paper see Lipsey et al. (1956).
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In the macroeconomics literature, Haltinwanger et al. (1985 and 1989) 
studies environments with strategic complementarities in which there ex-
ist heterogeneity in abilities to form expectations. These analyses indicate 
that, given complementarities, less sophisticated agents can have a large 
impact as sophisticated agents select actions that do not offset but rein-
force the initial impact of naïve choices. In contrast to these contributions, 
the present analysis does not allow for agents which unlimited prediction 
abilities. In addition, this paper studies the impact of changes in skills and 
policies in a context with no strategic complementarities.
Our contribution is also related to behavioral game theory analyses 
that study scenarios in which players’ strategic sophistication is limited. 
That is, players are not able to fully understand the incentives of others’ 
and hence might not be able to correctly anticipate their actions or the 
information contained in their actions. These analyses typically allow for 
outcomes that, from the perspective of traditional analysis, can be termed 
as out of equilibrium (see for example Crawford, 2004; Camerer et al., 2004; 
Esponda, 2008; and Eyster and Rabin, 2005).
The next section presents the model and analyzes properties of the 
equilibrium. Section III evaluates scenarios in which the skills of sophis-
ticated households change. Section IV considers some policy implications 
that result from this analysis. Section V present discussions regarding this 
exercise and evaluates potential extensions.
II. Model
In this section we introduce a simple model of saving decisions under het-
erogeneous levels of skills. Consider a two period model in which house-
holds’ preferences are represented by a separable utility function u(c1i , c2i) 
= u(c1i ) + u(c2i ). Where cji represents quantity consumed by household i of 
the unique good of the economy in period j. In both periods, income across 
households is the same and there is no storage technology. First period in-
come, w1, is known but second period income, w2 , is uncertain with distribu-
tion N  w 2( , )w . For each period, all households earn the same income level. 
Borrowing and lending activity is permitted through a financial mar-
ket. In this market, households exchange units of period 1 goods for con-
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tracts in which the issuer promises to transfer the holder units of period 
2 goods. For simplicity, it can be assumed that there is a central counter-
party that takes one side in every transaction. The interest rate R is equal 
to the quantity of period 2 goods conceded in a contract that is sold for one 
unit of period 1 good. This interest rate is determined by the market clear-
ing condition. Let li represent the quantity borrowed by household i, or the 
negative of the quantity lent by household i. In our simple setting, each 
agent selects, for a given level of the interest rate R, the level of borrowed/
lent funds, li. The associated budget constraints are given by:
1 1i ic w l= +
2 2i ic w Rl= −
Heterogeneity will enter through differences in the way household un-
derstand their environment. We consider an economy populated by two 
types of households: naïve and sophisticated. We assume that there is a 
continuum of measure 1 of each type of agent. The only distinction be-
tween households will be associated with skills through which they learn 
about future income. Assuming the existence of two groups with very dif-
ferent skills is a simplification that allows for a more clear understanding 
of the outcomes associated with the model. Similar representations with 
less strict assumptions would lead to qualitatively similar results.
We assume each household selects a savings level according to a simple 
rule. Given their beliefs about future income, both types of households 
select the amount of savings or borrowings as a function of the expected 
income, current income and the interest rate. A reasonable rule would re-
sult in higher borrowings in response to an increase in expected future 
income, a decrease in current income or a raise in the interest rate. We 
postulate that the amount borrowed equals: l(Ei [w2], w1, R) = 1/2 {(Ei [w2] / 
R)- w1}. Where Ei [w2] is the expected value of income in period 2 according 
to agent i’s beliefs.
That is, borrowings equal one half of the difference between the present 
value of future income and current income. This rule satisfies the property 
that the associated consumption profile responds to the relative price of 
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consumption in each period, and the present value of wealth. It can be ra-
tionalized by observing that this would be the choice made in the certainty 
equivalence case by an agent with logarithmic preferences. In essence, this 
rule captures a tradeoff between gains from responding to price and losses 
from asymmetric consumption profile. These tradeoffs are evaluated in 
expected values of consumption profiles, that is, abstracting from uncer-
tainty. As a result, this rule can be seen as a form of overconfident behav-
ior. The interpretation of this work can be made based on this premise.
II.1 Naïve Households
Naïve households receive a signal of the second period income ni = n + ui 
where n and ui are iid random variables distributed normally according to 
2( , )nN n   and 
2(0, )uN  respectively. That is, we assume these households re-
ceive uninformative correlated signals and make decisions that are influ-
enced by these signals. Given the simple rule proposed as a characterizing 










Their characterization involves two types of naïveté, one is fundamen-
tal and deals with the lack of information in the private signals regarding 
future income; the second is strategic and is given by the absence of any 
consideration of the information contained in others’ choices. 
II.2. Sophisticated households
In contrast, the sophisticated households receive unbiased but noisy sig-
nals of their future income flow. The precision of this signal is an aspect 
of the fundamental sophistication of this type of households. In addition 
each sophisticated household receives a signal of the average beliefs of na-
ïve households. They use this signal jointly with current prices to infer in-
formation about future income. Their strategic sophistication is captured 
by this process. Note that inferring information from prices requires hav-
ing a model of how different information sets of naïve and sophisticated 
households lead to different actions and associated prices. As a result, 
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the capacity to infer information through this process is bounded by the 
mistakes of the signal regarding naïve beliefs and the shortcomings of the 
models regarding how prices are formed. 
More specifically, sophisticated households receive an unbiased signal 
of the second period income, 2 2
s
i iw w e= +  where ei’s are independent and 
identically distributed random variables with normal distribution given 
by 2(0, )eN . In addition, they have initial beliefs on naïve expectations given 
by 2ˆ0 ˆ( , )nn N n:  and perceive a signal of naïve households’ expectations 
0 ˆ( )
Sn n n n v= + − +  with v distributed according to 2(0, )vN . That is, we al-
low for an informative but biased signal in addition we allow for errors in 
the evaluation of the precision of priors beliefs regarding naïve expecta-
tions. We assume sophisticated households act as if this signal and the 
beliefs on its precision were correct.
Given R and nS sophisticated households extract a signal of future in-
come. This signal extraction exercise exploits the fact that, in this economy, 
there is a positive association between interest rates and average expecta-
tions of future income.2 The problem to be solved involves assessing the 
impact of noisy households on market prices. This impact is a function of 
how much does sophisticated households’ behavior offset this noisy price 
pressure. We assume that sophisticated households think all households 
make financial decisions that are based on a simple use of their private sig-
nals on future income. That is, the price signal is extracted assuming that 
naïve decide using ni as their future income and that sophisticated house-
holds make financial decisions using 2
S
iw  as their future income. In other 
words, we assume that sophisticated households’ representation of others 
behavior is a simplification that ignores the fact that other sophisticated 
households would also infer information from prices and use prior beliefs 
in their assessment of future wealth.3 As a result, in this hypothetical ex-
ercise, the demand for loans for each type of household is given by: 
2. This association is the result of the simplifying assumptions regarding the structure of this economy. 
In economies with risky contracts and investment this simple association does not need to hold.
3. This assumption is in line with contributions in behavioral game theory that evaluate the existence of 
bounds in the understanding of other players’ strategic responses. Despite common priors and knowl-
edge of the structure of the game, these bounds on strategic reasoning imply that there is no full coordi-
nation of expectations and actions selected are out of equilibrium. (see Crawford, 1997).


















Then, the interest rate is thought to be the result of the following mar-
ket clearing condition:
2( , ) ( , ) 0
S
i ii i
l n R di l w R di+ =∫ ∫
Replacing the demand functions, integrating across agents and solving 








That is, through their inference process, sophisticated players conclude 
that there is an affine function that describes the relationship between fu-
ture income, average naïve expectations and the interest rate. In this way, 
sophisticated players come up with a second signal of future income that 
is a function of the interest rate and their private signal regarding the ex-
pectations of naïve households:
2 1ˆ 2 ( | )
S S
iw w R E n n= −
Where: 
2 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ 1 1[ | ]
S
S
n v n v
n nE n n
   
= + +      
   
Under the assumptions made by the household in this signal extraction 
exercise, conditioning on signal nS, the expectation of 2ˆ
S
iw  is w2, that is, this 
second signal is thought to be an unbiased predictor of future income. 
Note that, according to this inference process, deviations of the signal 
from the true value are the result of errors in the expectations of the aver-
age beliefs of naïve households. In addition, according to the assumptions 
of the inference process, the variance of this signal is given by:










In this way, sophisticated households observe two signals, 2
S
iw  and 2ˆ
S
iw . 
We assume that, the updated beliefs are formed using Bayes’ rule. This as-
sumption result in what has been referred in the literature as quasi-bayes-
ian expectations4; that is, Bayesian updating based on mistaken assump-
tions about the distribution of the signals.5 Using Bayesian updating, the 
two signals result in the following updated expectations of future income 





















For this type of household, expected income equals a weighted sum 
of the prior, a private signals and the public signal inferred from the mar-
ket equilibrium. The weights are given by the assessment of precision at-
tached to each element. These beliefs are associated to a demand for loans 
given by: 
2 2 2 1( , , ) ( [ | , , ] ) / 2
S S S S
i il R n w E w R n w Rw R= −
II.3. Equilibrium
Thus, we have already determined the behavior of each type of households 
given the process through which they form beliefs. Given these behavioral 
responses we can use the market clearing condition together with naïve 
and sophisticated households’ expectations to determine the condition 
that must be met by the equilibrium interest rate. The corresponding mar-
4. See for example models of confirmatory bias (Rabin et al., 1999) and local representativeness (Rabin, 
2002).
5. Our qualitative results do not depend on the updating of beliefs through Bayes’ rule. We would observe 
similar outcomes under alternative specifications of weighting of the signals.
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ket clearing condition results from setting the sum of the demand func-
tions of sophisticated households and naïve households equal to zero:
2 2
2 2 1 1
( , ) ( [ | , , ], )








l n R di l E w R n w R di








Replacing the expressions corresponding to the expectations of each 
type of household and calculating the integral across households results in 
an expression that identifies the interest rate in an implicit form:
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In this expression the interest rate appears in the two sides of the inequal-
ity. This reflects the dual role that this price plays in this market clearing 
mechanism. On one hand, the interest rate has a direct negative impact on 
the demand for loans given by what can be identified as the traditional re-
sponse of a demand function. The second effect is given by the information 
contained in prices. Higher prices are identified as signal of higher future 
income by sophisticated agents, and as a result, this increases the demand 
for loans. This is reflected by the appearance of R on the right hand side of 
the equation. Replacing  2wˆ , solving for R and rearranging we get an explicit 
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This expression provides a clear picture of the determinants of the in-
terest rate in this model. The first term inside brackets captures the impact 
of sophisticated traders’ fundamental information. This term gets closer to 
w2 as the precision of the signal 2ˆ
S
iw  gets large, that is, as  
21 / e  increases. 
The second term inside brackets, n, captures the direct impact of na-
ïve price pressure. Higher beliefs by naïve investors drive interest rates 
up. The last two terms capture the impact of surprises that sophisticated 
households’ suffer regarding the value of naïve beliefs.  More specifically, 
the third term captures de deviations with respect to prior beliefs, nˆ , and 
the fourth term captures deviations with respect to the signal perceived, 
nS. Surprises with a positive sign mean that sophisticated agents attrib-
uted, mistakenly, higher interest rates to higher sophisticated agents’ fun-
damental signals. This, in turn, increases sophisticated households’ future 
income expectations and increases their demand for loans. As a result, due 
to the nature of the inference process, naïve beliefs which are higher than 
expected by sophisticated agents imply higher interest rates. The impact 
of each type of surprise, with respect to priors or with respect to signals, 
depends on the beliefs regarding the precision of each piece of informa-
tion. The higher the precision attributed to the prior,  2ˆ1 / n , the higher the 
impact of a deviation from the prior, ˆn n− . 
There are similar implications for the link between the impact of devia-
tions of the signal, n-nS, and the precision of the signal,  21 / v. Note that the 
impact of each of these deviations is also a function of the precision of the 
fundamental prior and the fundamental signal. Higher precision, lower 
 2
w and  
2
e , imply a lower impact of the deviations between expected and 
actual naïve beliefs. In the limit, as  2w or  
2
e  converge to zero, the impact of 
their deviation converges to zero. On the other hand, the second compo-
nent, “n”, has an impact that does not depend on the precision of funda-
mental information. That is, a form of demand pressure that is not offset 
by informed investors’ actions.
To summarize, interest rate increases are the result of multiple factors: 
increases in future wealth, shocks in naïve preferences and mistakes in the 
priors or the signals regarding naïve beliefs.
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II.4. Description of equilibrium outcomes
In this subsection we intend to provide simple illustrations of the outcomes 
associated to this environment. For simplicity we normalize the parame-
ters in this model: 1 1w w= =  and set the same value for the variance of the 
error term in  2 2 2 2ˆ 1v n w e= = = = . Then expressions for the equilibrium 
outcomes of the model simplify to:
2 ˆ11 (2 )
2 2 2
S
e w n n nR n
 + − −




ˆ1 4 3[ | , , ]
2 4 4
S S
e S S i
i












w n n n
= −










e S S e
i S
w w
n n n w
l E w R n w R
w n n n
+
+ + − −
= −
+ + − −
We will consider the outcomes associated to four simple scenarios. We 
will evaluate the corresponding level of the interest rate and the quantities 
lent or borrowed by the modal agent of each type. In all these cases we fo-
cus on the effect of n aïve agent expectational shocks and will assume there 
are no fundamental shocks, that is 2w w= . 
The first scenario we consider, “a”, is the benchmark case in which 
there are no surprises. In “a” average naïve beliefs are correct, n = w2, and 
there are no mistakes in the sophisticated beliefs regarding naïve expecta-
tions, nˆ n n= = . In this scenario the interest rate equals R* = 1, the future 
income expectations of the modal sophisticated agent are correct and loan 
levels of the modal agents are zero ( 1 2 2( ,1) ( [ |1, , ],1) 0
Sl n l E w n w= = ).
Next, we consider a scenario, case “b” in which naïve households’ aver-
age beliefs are higher than future income but sophisticated households an-
ticipate perfectly this shock to beliefs. That is, we consider a case in which 
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2 ˆw n n n< = = . In this case, the equilibrium interest rate is higher that the 
perfect information value: Re = 1/2 + n/2 > 1. But sophisticated households 
make no mistake, the beliefs of the modal sophisticated household are cor-
rect E[w2|Re, nS, w2] = 1 with resulting borrowed quantities l(E [w2|Re, n, 1], 
Re) = 1/(1 + n) – 1/2 < 0. Not surprisingly given the market clearing condi-
tion, the modal naïve household’s borrowed quantities are given by l(ni, 
Re) = n/(1+n) – 1/2 > 0. Hence, with naïve expectations which are overopti-
mistic but correctly anticipated by sophisticated households, the interest 
rate would increase and sophisticated households would on average lend 
to naïve households. Sophisticated households accommodate part of the 
naïve price pressure by lending at rate that is higher than what would be 
observed under perfect information. That is, the impact hits both price and 
volume.
We can consider two alternatives to the case we have just analyzed. one 
alternative scenario would be the case in which sophisticated households 
partially anticipate naïve expectations shock. While we could also consider 
the case in which naïve expectations shocks are completely unexpected.
Suppose the case of partial anticipation (case “c”). In this case we as-
sume that prior beliefs indicate that naïve households are on average right, 
that is 2w n= ; overoptimistic naïve beliefs are signaled to sophisticated 
households by 2nˆ n w= > . In this case the equilibrium interest rate equals 
Re = 1/4 + 3n/4; this is higher than the interest rate of the previous example 
as sophisticated investors attribute part of the demand pressure to higher 
income in the following period. Sophisticated expectations are given by: 
E[w2|Re, n, w2] = 1/2 + n/2. Borrowing by a modal naïve player equals l(ni, 
Re) = 2/(3+1/n) – 1/2 > 0 and the negative of sophisticated lending equals: 
l(E [w2|Re, n, 1], Re) = 1/2 – 2/(3 + 1/n) < 0. In this case, there is a smaller 
amount of transactions as sophisticated agents are less willing to lend giv-
en their optimistic expectations on future income.
Finally, consider case “d” in which naïves’ expectations shock is not 
anticipated by priors or signals. That is, we consider the case in which 
2 ˆw n n n= = < . The equilibrium interest rate equals Re = n this is also equal 
to the conditioned expectations of income by sophisticated households: 
E[w2|Re, 1, w2] = n. The loan levels of the modal sophisticated household 
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and the modal naïve household equal 0. That is, sophisticated households 
attribute all the increment in the interest rate to informative fundamental 
signals, thus, at this high rate, unlike what occurs in the previous examples; 
they are not willing to make loans. This is the case in which the interest rate 
deviates the most from what would be observed under perfect information. 
At the same time, the consumption path of the modal players coincides with 
what would be observed under an efficient allocation. As a result, mistakes 
in expectations blocks transactions that would have reduced the efficiency 
of the equilibrium allocation. This equilibrium could be interpreted as a situ-
ation in which there is no trade between naïve and sophisticated households, 
the only trade in the market for loans can be attributed to trades between 
agents of the same type that receive different signals.
Table No. 1 summarizes the results for the four scenarios under con-
sideration. Moving from “b” to “d” we move from a situation in which 
sophistication expectations are correct, prices are relatively close to the 
perfect information benchmark and sophisticated agents make important 
loans to naïve agents to a situation in which sophisticated are overoptimis-
tic, prices react in great fashion to naïve expectations shocks but there is 
little/none trade between sophisticated and naïve. Case “c” falls in between 
these two cases. Thus there is an evident tension between the efficiency of 
prices and the efficiency of the consumption paths. 
Table No. 1: Summary of outcomes under selected scenarios
Case R e
A  (perfect information) 1 1 0 0
B  (totally anticipated 
naïve shock) 1
C  (partially anticipated  
naïve shock)
D  (not anticipated 
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II.5. Some comparisons with a perfect information economy
The equilibrium of this economy deviates from what would be observed 
in a model with perfectly anticipated income or an economy in which 
there is no naïve price pressure and private information on fundamentals 
is properly aggregated. As shown in the examples of the previous sub-
section, the deviations involve both, the interest rate and the quantities 
saved individually and in the aggregate. In this subsection instead of fo-
cusing on specific outcomes we will focus on the distribution of outcomes. 
Complementary, numerical evaluation of expected welfare levels will be 
illustrated in the next section.
With perfect information the equilibrium interest rate would equal R* = 
w2 / w1. In expectation the deviation between the equilibrium interest rate 
and the interest rate of the perfect information benchmark case equals:
 
1
1 2 2 2 2
ˆ
ˆ( )( * )
2 1 1 1 12
n v w e






+ +    
  
Thus, the average equilibrium interest rate is different from the average 
benchmark interest rate due to mistaken beliefs regarding the fundamental 
and mistaken beliefs regarding naïve beliefs about fundamentals. The first 
term on the right side of the equation captures differences between the aver-
age beliefs of naïve households and the average future income. The second 
term captures differences between the average beliefs of naïve households 
and the average beliefs that sophisticated households hold regarding the be-
liefs of naïve investors. The importance of the first factor does not depend on 
the value of priors and signals precisions. This is because in this model, even 
under no uncertainty, sophisticated households do not offset the price pres-
sure introduced by naïve households. This is a consequence of the imperfect 
substitutability between consumption in different periods and the restricted 
set of contracts that households are allowed to trade. In contrast, the second 
term does depend on the precision of the priors and signals; as they become 
more precise this term disappears.
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In a similar way we can calculate the variability of the deviation of the 
equilibrium interest rate from the interest rate that would be observed in an 
economy with perfect information. The resulting expression is given by:
2 2
2 2













     + + + + +          − =  
  
+      
To develop a simpler interpretation of this expression we assume that 
the average difference is zero, that is ˆn w n= = , in this way, the variance 





. In addition, we assume that there are no errors in the precision 
attributed to the prior beliefs of n,  2 2nˆ n= . The equation above implies that 
the variance of the interest rate converges to  2 2 21( ) 4n w+  as the preci-
sion of the fundamental signal of sophisticated households converges to 1. 
That is, the variations in the interest rate due to mistakes in the inference 
from prices disappear. 
Additionally, as the prior variance of naïve expectations or the variance 
of error of signal of naïve expectations converges to zero, the mean square 
deviations of the interest rate grows without bound. In other words, as the 
information regarding naïve expectations becomes precise, the interest rate 
reaction to information regarding naïve beliefs becomes so strong that, in 
the limit, the variance of its deviations with respect to the benchmark rate 
grows without bound. In particular, this means that the interest rate as an 
aggregator of fundamental information is a worse signal as the informa-
tion on naïve expectations becomes more precise. This result is explained 
by errors in the inference process from prices that are caused by too sim-
plistic models of others’. As indicated above, we assume that this infer-
ence process is carried out assuming that other sophisticated households 
receive informative signals regarding fundamentals but act naively given 
this data. That is, their actions are assumed to reflect more private infor-
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mation than they really do. This implies that market prices are assumed to 
be more informative that they actually are, this excessive reaction grows 
with the perceived precision of their information regarding naïve beliefs.6 
This has welfare costs for both naïve and sophisticated households that we 
will illustrate in the next section.
III. Changes in sophisticated households’ skills
In this section we provide two numerical illustrations of the welfare levels 
associated to different levels of sophistication. First we will consider the 
welfare impact of an increase in the precision with which sophisticated 
households observe naïve households’ expectations. Secondly, we will 
consider variations in the precision of sophisticated households’ private 
signals regarding future income. In this context we evaluate the welfare 
impact of having sophisticated households that become increasingly bet-
ter informed about fundamental aspects than naïve households.
In parts of the analysis we focus on the ex-ante social welfare function 
with equal weights on both types of households. This would be the ex-
pected welfare level of a household whose type is randomly determined 
according to the proportion of households of each type.
We specify a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function, 
in this way the distinction between decision utility and experienced util-
ity is explicitly presented. That is, while agents’ decisions satisfy a simple 
rule, their welfare is determined by the computation of a specific expected 
welfare function.
Additionally, to avoid negative consumption levels, we will impose a 
lower bar on second period income and consumption given by k. That is, 
second period income is truncated at k. Similarly, independently of the in-
dividual budget constraint, second period consumption is guaranteed to be 
at least k. A borrower i will then default on their obligations if Rli. > w2 - k. In 
particular, if w2 < k all borrowers default on their promises. For w2 > k there 
is a fraction of borrowers that defaults on their obligations. We assume that 
individual default risk is shared across all lenders; we can think of a central 
6. For an early contribution on excessive volatility in asset prices see Shiller (1981).
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counterparty that implements a risk sharing scheme. In this way assuming 
normal distribution of w2 and the impossibility of defaults is another simpli-
fication made during the decision process.
For a given income level w2 > k, naïve mean beliefs n and sophisticated 
agents’ beliefs about naïve mean beliefs nS, there is a critical value for a 
sophisticated agent private signal 2
S
iw
 above which the agent will default. 
This critical level 2
S
iw  is defined by: 
2 2 1
2
[ | , , ]
2 2
S S
iE w R n w ww k
R
− = −
The explicit expression is given by: 
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Similarly, for a given income level w
2
 > k, naïve mean beliefs n and so-
phisticated agents’ beliefs about naïve mean beliefs nS there is a critical vale 
for a naïve agent private signal above which the agents default on their 






which can be explicitly expressed as: 
2 12 ( )in R w k Rw= − +
Then, the losses associated with default equal the mean value of the 
loans taken by agents that defaulted times the quantity of agents that de-
faulted. These losses generate a proportional drop in the payment that 
lenders receive. The loss from naïve agents equals:
( ) [ ( , )| ]n i i i i iL Pr n n E l R n n n= > >
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For sophisticated agents the expression is: 
2 2 2 2 2 2ˆ( ) [ ( , , )| ]
S S S S S S S
i i i i i iL Pr w w E l R w w w w= > >
The adjusted return of lenders equals: 
' ( ) /S nR R L L L L= − −
where L is the original total value of outstanding loans. 
Throughout the next equations we assume that the parameters are giv-
en by:
 2 2 2 2
ˆ 1 / 10u n n w= = = =
We will consider variations in the precision of sophisticated house-
holds signals regarding future income ( 2e  ) and sophisticated households’ 
signals regarding naïve household beliefs ( 2v ). 
Additionally we assume parameter values: 
1 ˆ 1w w n n= = = =
That is, we assume that in ex-ante terms, expected future income and 
current income coincide and there are no systematic biases in naïve beliefs 
or sophisticated households’ beliefs regarding naïve beliefs. Finally, we set 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 2.
III.1. The precision of information regarding naïve households’ beliefs
First, we evaluate welfare levels for different values of the precision of the 
sophisticated households’ signals regarding naïve’s beliefs, that is, differ-
ent values of  2v. For this exercise we set  
2
e . Figure 1 presents the approxi-
mated values of the expected value of the payoff functions of sophisticated 
households and naïve households. First, as expected, we observe that the 
welfare level of naïve households is lower than the one corresponding to 
sophisticated households. In addition, the values of the welfare function 
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are relatively constant for sufficiently high values of  2v. Approximately 
for values below  2v = 1/10 both welfare functions show a noticeable reduc-
tion in their levels as precision of the nS signal decreases or, equivalently, 
as  2v increases. 
As we hinted in our description of the equilibrium in the previous 
section, this result can be explained by the inadequate interpretation of 
market signals. As nS becomes more, precise, sophisticated agents become 
more trustful of their interpretation of market signals. But this interpreta-
tion of market signals is based on the assumption that other sophisticated 
agents act more naively that what they actually do. This imperfect infer-
ence process results in excess volatility that decreases welfare levels. An 
example of the increment in volatility can be obtained by observing the 
deviations of the simulated value of the interest rate with respect to the 
perfect information benchmark. In our simulations the mean squared dif-
ference increases from 0,085 to 0,102 as the variance of signal nS drops from 
0,10 to 0,025.
This result is suggestive of negative externalities associated to the ac-
quisition of information. While the present work does not deal with infor-
mation choice, it can be observed that this figure indicates the existence 
of regions in which the choices might not incorporate negative external 
effects and, in this way, lead to excessive information acquisition. If the in-
dividual gains from getting information exceed the social gains, too much 
information could be acquired in equilibrium. It must be observed that this 
result occurs in a context in which there are other aspects of the learning 
process that are imperfect. That is, the analysis consists in evaluating the 
impact of changing only one of the aspects that generate incorrect beliefs. 
In other words, a context where the second best principle holds.
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Figure No. 1: Welfare and precision of signals regarding naïve beliefs
























Note: Sophisticated households (dots). Naïve households (continuous line).
III.2. The precision of information regarding naïve households’ beliefs
In this subsection we inspect the impact of an increment in the precision 
of sophisticated households’ private signal regarding future income ( 2
S
iw ). 
For the purpose of this analysis, we set parameter  2v equal to 0.10. Figure 
No. 2 presents the welfare levels calculated in the simulations. The figure 
shows that an increment in the precision of the signal, that is, a drop in 
parameter  2e , is associated to an increment in the welfare level of sophisti-
cated households and a drop in the welfare level of naïve households. This 
change is particularly noticeable for high levels of precision.
Additionally, the negative welfare impact on naive households is larger 
than the positive impact on sophisticated households’ welfare. More pre-
cise information allows sophisticated households to trade advantageously 
but the private gains are smaller than the social cost, since these trades 
involve inefficiencies in the consumption paths.
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Figure No. 2: Welfare and precision of sophisticated 
private signals regarding future income 



























Note: Sophisticated households (dots). Naïve households (continuous line).
IV. The impact of simple policy rules
In this section, an analysis of the impact of policy measures is developed. 
The analysis intends to illustrate the welfare impact of simple policies, in a 
context in which there are different levels of sophistication. We identify sim-
ple policies as those whose content is not conditioned on detailed informa-
tion of the beliefs of different agents. More specifically, we will consider a 
rule that imposes upper and lower bounds on the value of the interest rate.
Before proceeding, it is worth keeping in mind the specific environ-
ment in which these exercises are developed. In the current simple repre-
sentation, agents are trading contracts, but on aggregate terms there is an 
exogenously determined level of endowments to be consumed in each pe-
riod. Trading does not allow aggregate intertemporal reallocations. Trad-
ing simply allows taking speculative positions based on individual beliefs. 
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In this context, it is to be expected that policies that restrict the ability to 
trade might be welfare improving. Naturally, this result might not hold 
in context where trading allows for aggregate intertemporal reallocation 
of consumption and market information can be used to make better deci-
sions. This model can be viewed as an analysis that describes properties of 
an economy in a limit case.7 
IV.1. Price collars
As indicated above, one simple policy rule might involve a constraint on the 
interest rate. More specifically, consider a scenario in which the only con-
tracts that can be written involve interest rates that are inside a price collar 
given by LB = 1 – r < R < UB = 1 + r. Where r is termed collar parameter. We 
assume that households’ observe the excess demand or excess supply and 
hence, make the same inferences that would be made in a market without 
constraints on prices. In the case of an operative constraint on R, a propor-
tional rationing rule is assumed to resolve the excess in demand or supply.
Consider a setting in which the parameter values are as proposed in the 
previous section with the additional assumption that sophisticated signals 
precisions are as determined by  2 2 1 / 10v e= = . We evaluate welfare levels 
for a collar parameter ranging from 10, basically an unrestricted interest 
rate, to 0, constant interest rate equal to 1. 
As shown in Figure Nr. 3, a price collar would significantly increase 
welfare level of naïve households without having a large negative impact 
on sophisticated households’ welfare. This pattern indicates that if welfare 
is calculated in ex-ante terms, i.e. before a household learns whether it 
belongs to the sophisticated or naïve group, welfare would be increased 
through a restriction in price variation.
Keeping the interest rate at a constant level reduces the difference in wel-
fare levels of sophisticated and naïve households but does not eliminate the 
gap in the welfare level for these two types of agent. This is in part because, 
7. This exercise is comparable to analyses in which the performance of markets is evaluated assuming 
that all agents have the same abilities to form expectations and their decisions reflect well calibrated 
levels of confidence. The outcomes associated with this scenario should also be evaluated keeping in mind 
the limited range of validity.
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even though prices do not change, sophisticated households benefit from 
trading against less sophisticated households. This result suggests that, un-
der heterogeneous expectations, a policy that restricts price variations is not 
able to eliminate the inefficiencies associated to inadequate expectations.
on the other hand, sophisticated household’s expected welfare is below 
the one they would obtain if they were able to access to a constant income 
level in the second period equal to the expected value of future income, 
that is, if they were able to eliminate uncertainty in actuarially fair terms. 
In this case, welfare level would be 0 which is higher than the values ob-
served in Figure No. 3. The previous observations suggest that in this sim-
ple context, absent any intervention on beliefs, restrictions on transactions 
are the type policy that would do the most to restore efficiency. Naturally, 
in an environment in which gains from trade become sufficiently large, 
there will be tradeoffs associated to restrictions in trade. 
Figure No. 3: Welfare with price collars 
























Note: Sophisticated households (dots). Naïve households (continuous line).
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V. Discussion
The present work constitutes a simple exercise that explores market out-
comes associated to heterogeneity in the ability to form expectations and 
learn from other households’ decisions. The exercise suggests that sophis-
ticated agents’ conduct is not enough to guarantee an efficient allocation. 
In addition, increases in certain learning skills might be associated to neg-
ative externalities and lower welfare levels. Finally, restrictions in price 
variation might increase welfare in ex-ante terms but need not restore ef-
ficiency. 
In this way, the present study advances the understanding of environ-
ments characterized by heterogeneity in abilities to form expectations. 
The results provide a sharp contrast with what would be observed under 
unbounded or homogeneous abilities. The evaluations developed in the 
present work could be analyzed in more general contexts or under more 
general profiles of learning processes. In the following paragraphs, we 
provide a brief discussion regarding robustness of our findings and direc-
tions for future research.
V.1. On profiles of skills 
We have focused on the detailed analysis of the outcomes associated with 
alternative profiles of sophistication in a simple environment. We made a 
strong separation between sophisticated and naïve households in order to 
carry out a more tractable analysis. We believe that our qualitative results 
would not change if we allow for a more gradual differentiation between 
households with different levels of skills.
We assume that each household has certain level of correct information 
about the environment, some information is absent and sometimes they 
are aware of which information they possess and which information they 
do not possess. our model does not develop a dynamic model of how this 
profile of skills and information emerges. In particular, our contribution 
does not suggest that the given profile of skills is in a stationary state and it 
does not suggest a process through which that profile of skills is attained. 
A framework that explains this type of profiles would bear in mind that 
different agents make use of cognitive processes at different frequencies and 
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with different intensities. Additionally, in some circumstances, behavior is 
be governed mostly by some acquired habits, easily available information, 
rules of thumb to assess future income or simple intuitive signals. These pro-
cesses have low cognitive costs, might occur below awareness and are typi-
cally triggered automatically. Despite its low cognitive costs these processes 
can generate very suitable decisions as in the case of well trained intuitive 
responses.  Behavior is also be shaped by more sophisticated processes such 
as the consideration of hard to get information, the evaluation of hypotheti-
cal scenarios and inferences through logical rules. 
The use of alternative cognitive processes and the development of skills 
that improve their output are a function of history and the perception of 
the individual stakes associated to the decision problem. It is not necessar-
ily the case that learning process should converge to a state in which all 
players end up with high sophistication levels. Tversky et al. (1974) sug-
gest that biases in intuitive judgments might not be eliminated if the errors 
in past predictions are not properly processed. Even for the case of sophis-
ticated households, it is not necessarily the case that their models of others 
will converge to the right model. For convergence to occur environment 
needs to be stable, the feedback needs to be frequent and results have to be 
processed in a way that the mistake is identified.
V.2. On alternative environments
The environment in which we carried out the analysis is highly stylized. 
This choice was made with the intention of facilitating the identification 
of the channels through which a rich profile of learning processes affects 
outcomes. Nevertheless, for the analysis of some relevant economic phe-
nomena the environment considered in this model needs to incorporate 
alternative features. In this section we give examples of which features ap-
pear as natural candidates.
One characteristic of our exercise is the property that actions are strate-
gic substitutes. That is, abstracting from informational inferences, higher 
demand for loans by a fraction of the households increases the market 
clearing prices and, thus, leads to lower demand levels by the remaining 
households. Richer phenomena would be observed if strategic comple-
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mentarities in actions were allowed. Complementarities in actions are 
likely to occur in an economy with production and investment.8 Addition-
ally, complementarities in actions can generate complementarities in in-
formation acquisition. That is, if more agents are responding to a set of 
information the incentives to acquire that information become stronger 
(see Veldkamp, 2011).
Another complementary aspect that were not considered is the possibil-
ity of bankruptcy and the ability to trade different types of financial con-
tracts. The type of contract considered simply involves the exchange of cur-
rent units of a single good for future units of the unique good on that date. 
A more complex contractual setting opens the question about the ca-
pacity of agents to anticipate the distribution of payoffs associated to a 
transaction. As in the case of anticipating future income, it is reasonable to 
assume that, in a complex contractual setting, agents’ capacity to under-
stand the implications of alternative contracts is asymmetric. As in the case 
of strategic complementarities we believe that contractual issues can bring 
interesting insights about how different profiles of sophistications can be 
associated to alternative economic outcomes.
8. See Cooper et al. (1988) for a general perspective on the impact of strategic complementarities in 
macroeconomics. See Haltiwanger et al. (1985, and 1989) for an analysis of naïve behavior in an envi-
ronment with complementarities.
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